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Learning from Rwanda: Addressing the
Global Institutional Stalemate in Refugee Crises

LESLIE

E. SCHAFER*

INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest global challenges of the past half century has been to
define the role of the international community to deal with refugee movements.
From the aftermath of World War I to the present, nations of the world have
adapted solutions to protect those threatened by violent conflict occurring in
their home country. However, the legal regime, within which the community
works, was primarily crafted immediately following World War 11. In some
instances, the United Nations has been successful in stepping quietly around the
strictures of international refugee law in order to deal effectively with the crisis
at hand. Yet, without fundamental change, the international community will
continue to act in an adhoc and many times unorganized fashion in response
to situations that produce major refugee movements.
Recent refugee flows show that the majority of those who flee their country
come from developing nations. In dealing with these modern situations, the
international community has turned its focus from protective measures to
providing humanitarian aid, both as emergency and developmental help to
impoverished nations rent by violence.' However, international aid alone cannot
fulfill the protective commitment that refugees so desperately need. By
examining the recent example of conflict in Rwanda, the inadequacies of many
current practices in refugee aid become more clear. Changes in the substantive

* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.P.A. Candidate, 2000,
Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs; B.A, French and English, 1995, St. Louis
University. The author would like to thank Professor David Fidler for his candid assessment of the first draft,
Professor Satvinder Juss for his helpful substantive suggestions, and Professor John Scanlan for his continuing
guidance and patience. Several others were instrumental to the development of this Note, to whom the author
remains gratefully indebted.
I. These conflicts diverted United Nations' activities (through the actions of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees) from a focus on protection of refugees through solutions such as repatriation and
resettlement to "helping people in flight and trying to keep them alive in camps." LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNHCR AT 40: REFUGEE PROTECTION AT THE CROSSROADS 34 (199 1).
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and procedural approaches of the international community regarding refugees
are necessary to achieve lasting resolutions to the seemingly interminable
problems of internal conflict in the developing countries of the world.
Part I will briefly describe the current legal refugee regime, focusing on the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention), as
well as exposing some pertinent regional agreements that have modified the
legal definition of "refugee." Part II will explain the backdrop of modern
refugee flows, using the example of the recent Rwandan crisis to illustrate
several steps in international refugee protection. Part Im will synthesize the
problems presented in Part II as related to the definitions of Part I, and suggest
solutions that will lead to an international framework that adequately addresses
the modern complexities of refugee-producing situations.
I. THE LEGACY OF REFUGEE PROTECTION:
FROM WORLD WAR H TO RWANDA

In 1950, the United Nations set up the office of the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) to help remedy the massive
displacements of people from the violence of World War 11.2 The Geneva
Convention defined the mandate of the UNHCR very narrowly? As the world
experienced further mass refugee flows, that mandate was redefined.' More
recently, protection for refugees has been expanded through regional agreements
and the "good offices" of the UNHCR.' This part will describe the legal
framework pertaining to refugees that has been developed by the United
Nations, as well as supplemental refugee definitions adopted by the
Organization for African Unity and the Cartagena Declaration, in order to
facilitate an analysis of the overlapping regimes with reference to the recent
crisis in Rwanda.

2. Id at 5.
3. This definition limited the term "refugee" to include people displaced before the Convention was
signed, and drew narrow geographical requirements. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July
28, 1951, chap. I, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152-56 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
4. LAWYERS COMMITIEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 1, at 5.
5. Id. at 6. The "good offices" of the UNHCR allow the agency to step outside its official mandate to
help people threatened in refugee-like situations. Id. at 32.
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A. Laying the Foundation: The Statute of the UNHCR
In late 1949, the United Nations General Assembly decided to create an
agency to address international refugee situations.6 Late the following year, the
General Assembly adopted the Statute ofthe Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (Statute). 7 The Statute provided, in broad terms,
a framework for the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and subsequent Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (New York
Protocol).
According to this Statute, the UNHCR is to "provid[e] international
protection" to refugees and "seek[] permanent solutions for the problem of
refugees" through "voluntary repatriation" or "assimilation within new national
communities."' Specifically, the Statute provides a narrow definition of the
term "refugee," 9 and describes eligibility requirements, including examples to
which UNHCR competence "shall not extend"'" as well as when such
competence "ceases.''"
Additionally, the Statute provides that "[t]he work of the High
Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be
humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of
refugees."' 2 The General Assemby or the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations provides "policy directives" for the UNHCR 3
B. The Definition of a Refugee
After the adoption of the Statute on December 14, 1950, the General
Assembly pushed forward, convening a conference at Geneva in 1951 to draft
a convention that would define the legal status of refugees. The Geneva

6. G.A. Res. 319, U.N. Doe. A/1251, at 36(1949).
7. G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5' Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). [hereinafter
Statute].
8. Id., Annex, I. "Voluntary repatriation" is the voluntary return of a refugee to his/her homeland;
"assimilation" will be discussed further as "resettlement," a solution that entails integrating a refugee into a
country other than his/her country of origin.
9. The "refugee" definition is substantively similar to that of the Convention as explained in subpart B,
which will be the basis of further discussion.
10. Statute, supra note 7, Annex, 7.
11. Id. 6.
12. Id. 2.
13. Id. 3.
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Convention was adopted in July 1951 and entered into force in April 1954. 4
One of the goals of the Geneva Convention was "to revise and consolidate
previous international agreements relating to the status ofrefugees and to extend
the scope of and protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new
agreement."' 5 As such, the Geneva Convention still serves as the definitive
international agreement on the status of refugees, with the modifications
discussed below.
From this Convention comes the basis of the modem legal definition of a
"refugee," which applies to any person who:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and
owing to well-foundedfearof beingpersecutedforreasonsof
race,religion,nationality,membershipofa particularsocial
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationalityand is unable or, owing to suchfear,is unwilling
to availhimselfof the protectionof that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
6
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.1
A close reading of the italicized terms above evinces the strictures of the legal
definition of a refugee. Only those falling within the prescribed categories can
be considered "refugees" within the parlance ofthe United Nations international
community.
The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees expands the definition of a
"refugee" by specifically deleting the words "as a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951 and" as well as "as a result of such events," which
allows those who fit the substantive but not timing requirements of the Geneva
Convention to be considered legal refugees. 7

14. Geneva Convention, supra note 3, 189 U.N.T.S. at 150 n.
15. Id., preamble, 189 U.N.T.S. at 150.
16. Id., chap. 1, art. I at 152 (emphasis added).
17. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967, art. 1, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,268 [hereinafter
New York Protocol].
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C. Expulsion and Refoulement
In addition to Article 1 of the Geneva Convention, where the refugee
definition is set out, two other Articles are pertinent to the discussion of refugee
problems in the context of this paper. Article 32 prohibits the expulsion of"a
refugee lawfully in [a Contracting State's] territory save on grounds of national
security or public order.""8 Also, Article 33 forbids a specific type of expulsion
known as "refoulement."' 9 To "refoule" a refugee means to return a refugee "to
the frontiers of territory where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion."2 Through later discussion, this Note will show how
the lines between what constitutes refoulement or expulsion and the facilitation
of voluntary repatriation are not always clear-cut.
D. Regional Agreements on Refugees
Although the Geneva Convention and the New York Protocol provide the
international framework for refugee protection, several regional agreements
provide the basis of supplementary definitions that broaden the mandate of
protection in different parts of the world.2 In particular, these agreements
broaden the definition of a refugee to deal with the realities of modern flows of
people fleeing civil wars.22
In 1969, still in the wake of newly found independence of many of its
members, the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU) adopted a refugee definition
and other provisions germane to the refugee problems in Africa. After using the
Geneva Convention definition, the OAU adds:

18. Geneva Convention, supra note 3, chap. 11,art. 32, 189 U.N.T.S. at 174.
19. Id., art. 32, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
20. Id.
21. Although some European documents such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Convention on Extradition are sometimes cited as bases
for extending protection, this paper is focused on crises in the developing world, which usually entail temporary
protection of refugees in a nation proximate to the refugee producing country, so European sources are not
discussed here.
22. See e.g., THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, 1993: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 165
(UNHCR ed. 1993) [hereinafter REFUGEES 1993] (citing OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, Sep. 10, 1969, art. 1, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47).
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The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who,
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin.
Another international instrument that redefines the term "refugee" was the
product ofthe colloquium on the International Protection ofRefugees in Central
America, Mexico, and Panama, held in 1984 in Cartagena, Colombia.24 This
definition "includes among refugees persons who have fled their country
because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human
rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."25
These more modem definitions of the term refugee should be borne in mind
throughout the remainder of this Note. Some of the problems surrounding
international involvement in refugee crises, such as that of Rwanda in the mid1990s, are intimately related to the international definition of a refugee, which
delineates explicitly who should benefit from international protection. Other
difficulties include defining the degree to which repatriation is actually
voluntary and when refoulement has occurred. Yet, the stalemate in refugee
crises is not due solely to a lack of modem definitions. Other layers of the
situation will be added in Part II, exploring the factual backdrop of modem
internal conflicts that produce refugees generally, and the context of Rwanda
in particular.
II. STUDYING RWANDA: A MODERN REFUGEE CRISIS

A. The Root of the Problem: Internal Conflict with Global Implications
Most developing countries that are experiencing internal conflict are in
"post-colonial" situations where people are struggling to determine the political

23. Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, Sep. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47.
24. "Although a non-binding instrument, the [Cartagena] Declaration has been accepted and is being
applied by the Latin American States to the degree that it has entered the domain of international law."
REFUGEES 1993, supra note 22, at 166.
25. Id.
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identity of their countries. The resulting civil wars often have global
implications. Some theorists believe that, generally, internal conflict threatens
global security.26 More specifically, the phenomenon becomes international in
nature when people flee their homelands, seeking temporary asylum or
resettlement outside their country of origin. The effects of such crises are felt
globally as refugees resettle or repatriate, changing ethnic and political balances
within States and regions. Looking at the historical background of Africa, and
in particular Rwanda, shows how many developing countries are dealing with
independence and struggling with political identities in the modem world.
1. The History of Political Unrest in Post-ColonialCountries
In pre-colonial Africa, forms of political control varied, but one common
characteristic in most traditional societies was the sanctity of kingship." In
Rwanda, "[t]he king lived at the center of a large court and was treated like a
divine being." European explorers observed the presence of monarchy in
several parts of the Interlakes region ofAfrica, theorizing that superior invaders
from the North (Ethiopia or Egypt) had subjugated the inferior masses.29
During the late nineteenth century in Rwanda, a Tutsi monarchy ruled over the
majority Hutu population.3" From the outset, colonial powers attempted to work
with and through the existing system of governance; in turn, Tutsis used the
colonial presence to enlarge their territory.3
By affirming Tutsi dominion, and through other practices, colonial powers
entrenched Tutsis as superior and Hutus as inferior. For example, before
colonialization, the king was the head of an otherwise decentralized system of
different chiefs.32 These men were charged with different functions that
overlapped geographically; one chief took care of landholdings, another ruled
the people, and a third was in charge of pastures.33 In 1929, the Belgian

26. See LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHrs, supra note 1, at 97.
27. Elikia M'Bokolo, Promise and Uncertainty, THE UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1992, reprinted in
GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, at 178 (F. Jeffress Ramsay, ed., 6' ed. 1995).
28. GERARD PRUNiER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY OF AGENOCIDE 9 (1995).
29. Id.at 10-11.
30. Martin Plaut, Rwanda: Looking Beyond the Slaughter, THE WORLD TODAY, Aug./Sept. 1994,
reprintedin GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supranote 27, at 235.
31. Id.at 235-36. Several surviving Hutu principalities on the periphery were incorporated into the
territory "only after the arrival of Europeans and with their help." PRJNIER, supranote 28, at 19 (emphasis
original).
32. PRUNIER, supra note 28, at 11.
33. Id.Often one of these chiefs was Hutu. Id.at 27.
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authorities condensed these three functions under the domain of one chief, the
vast majority of whom were Tutsi.34
After the end of World War II, "the growing spirit of democracy" led
Belgian trustees to encourage the Hutus to become educated and take part in
their society.35 Several political parties emerged; Tutsis struggled to maintain
some power while Hutus exercised their newly granted rights.36 In the fall of
1959, an attack on a Hutu leader began the violence. Hutus responded by
setting afire thousands ofTutsi homes. 3' Thousands of Tutsis were killed; over
a hundred thousand fled into exile, mostly to Uganda.38 At formal independence
in 1962, the Hutu majority was "firmly in control of the country," representing
39
a full reversal of the traditional relations between the Tutsis and Hutus.
The early 1970s saw regional disorder that began with violence in Burundi.
This ignited anew ethnic tensions in Rwanda that led to a coup in 1973 by the
Chief of Staff of the Army, who instituted a single party government to ensure
stability.4" The exiled Tutsis in Uganda were effectively kept from returning to
their homeland by strict conditions set by the government that allowed
repatriation only in limited circumstances.4 Later, the second-generation Tutsi
refugees formed the Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF).42 This military force
attempted to return to Rwanda in 1991 from Uganda, but was contained by
Zairean and French supporters of the Hutu government. 3
Realizing the potential for conflict, regional leaders came together in an
attempt to move forward toward democratic elections." Tensions rose; factions
split the new political parties. On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda and
the President of Burundi were both killed when their plane was attacked and
destroyed. 45 Blaming the attack on the Tutsis, Hutu extremists seized the

34. Id.
35. Plaut, supra note 30, at 236.
36. See id
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supra note 27, at 122.
40. Plaut, supra note 30, at 236.
41. GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supranote 27, at 121.
42. Id.
43. Plaut, supra note 30, at 237. In May 1997, Laurent Kabila took over the government of Zaire,
proclaiming himself President and changing the country's name to the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Throughout the remainder of this Note, both terms will be used interchangeably to denote what is today the
Democratic Republic of Congo, depending upon the appropriate time frame reference.
44. The Arusha Accord laid down a method ofpower sharing among groups before democratic elections
would be held. GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supra note 27, at 122.
45. See Plaut, supranote 30, at 237.
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government and began the Tutsi slaughter, intending to wipe out the Tutsi
population of Rwanda to prevent further reprisals.' By September 1994,
Rwanda's population was half of what it had been only months earlier.
2. The Short Fuse of Ethnicity
Political struggles, such as the repeated slaughters in Rwanda, have their
roots in ethnic tensions that were in place before colonization, but exacerbated
by the colonials.4 By creating the borders of the African States, colonial
powers forced populations into continued interaction with one another. 9
Among the more than fifty States in Africa, there exist over a thousand distinct
ethnic groups based on common language, religious beliefs, pre-colonial social
and political groups, and modes of subsistence."
It is difficult for an outsider to differentiate between Hutu and Tutsi; they
share a common language and many have intermarried." Historically, the Tutsi
ruled; they owned the cattle that the Hutus herded, and the fields in which the
Hutus planted. 2 According to an epic poem:
[T]he godlike ruler, Kigwa, fashioned a test to choose his
successor. He gave each of his sons a bowl of milk to guard
during the night. His son Gatwa drank the milk. Yahutu slept
and spilled the milk. Only Gatutsi guarded it well. The myth
justifies the old Rwandan traditional social order, in which the
Twa were the outcasts, the Hutu servants, and the Tutsi
aristocrats.5 3
These ethnic loyalties echo other alignments and roots ofdiscord around the
world. From the Kurds in Iraq to the separation of Czechoslovakia into

46. Id. at 238.
47. GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supra note 27, at 122. The decline is attributed both to deaths and the
flight of many Rwandans to neighboring countries.
48. Herbert Lewis, Ethnic Loyalties are on the Rise Globally, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec.
28, 1992, at 18, reprinted in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supra note 27, at 18 1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supranote 27, at 122.

52. See id.
53. Id. The Twa ethnic group make up about 1%of Rwanda's population and are commonly referred
to as Pygmies. Id.
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ethnically determined republics, the world has witnessed a wave of "ethnic
nationalism" that has become a potent factor in world politics.' Ethnic loyalties
implicate core values of peoples that are political in nature. Identifying with
such groups may "serve as the basis for social relations [and] the development
of new patterns of culture." 5 In the developing world, where economic
opportunities are limited and unequally distributed among ethnic groups,
appeals to group identities serve as powerful motivators. 6
Through recognition of new countries such as the Czech Republic and the
disintegration ofYugoslavia into ethnic republics, the international community
has recognized ethnicity as a legitimate basis of political organization."
However, the nations of modem Africa continue to remain, for the most part,
dedicated to maintaining the borders set by colonial powers.58
Preserving the States formed by colonization ensures continued political
tensions among the several ethnic groups that comprise developing States. As
violence is ignited and repeatedly erupts in ethnically diverse nations, refugee
flows become more problematic and complex. Repatriation efforts are
undermined by the continuous threat ofviolence within the country of origin.59
In addition, prospects for resettlement and integration into the host country are
dim; as discussed above, ethnic hatred led second-generation exiled Rwandans
in Uganda to disunite themselves and return home, spurring more violence.'
3. The Global Context of Internal Conflict
Although the ethnic struggles of developing nations seem to be internal
matters that do not directly affect the international community at large, several
facets of such "civil" wars evince the global nature of the problems faced by
developing countries. From the past domination by developed countries to
current humanitarian aid given to developing nations, the patterns of conflict
within nations are partially caused and perpetuated by the influences of the
larger international community. Also, managing ethnic conflicts has become
central to the "business ofmaintaining international peace and security" for the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Lewis, supra note 48, at 181.
Id.at 182.
See id.
See id.
See id.

59. See ROBERT F. GORMAN, COPING WITH AFRICA'S REFUGEE BURDEN: A TIME FOR SOLUTIONS 7

(1987).
60. See Plaut, supra note 30, at 236-37.
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United Nations and individual governments.6 Most important here is the reality
of the mass exodus of peoples that often accompanies internal struggles.
The international community through the UNHCR is committed to
protecting refugees from governments that torture or persecute their own
citizens. However, in recent years, changes have been made in how the
international community involves itself in such struggles. The main agency
providing relief to refugees is the UNHCR. As an intergovernmental
organization, the actions of the UNHCR in refugee situations are often
profoundly affected by concerns of the several governments from which the
agency receives funds.
Recently, in attempting to offer comprehensive solutions to refugee
problems, the UNHCR has begun providing development aid, as well as helping
internally displaced persons to rebuild their lives.62 Although these global
efforts are noble in intent, the effective protection of refugees is compromised
by the fragmentation of responsibility within agencies. 3 As the example of
Rwanda will show in the following sections, the primary goal of refugee
protection must be provided in a framework where physical rights are
guaranteed along with legal rights so that effective, durable solutions can be
crafted.
The work of the United Nations extends beyond the humanitarian efforts of
the UNHCR. To achieve the goals of "containment of ethnic conflicts, support
for self-determination [and] promotion of democracy," the Charter ofthe United
Nations allows for "coercive" as well as "peaceful" measures." Under this
rationale, the United Nations has been involved in the periodic violence that
explodes in Rwanda. 5
In June 1993, to help implement the Arusha Accord, the United Nations
created a military monitoring force, the United Nations Uganda-Rwanda
Troops were also deployed under a subsequent
Observation Mission.'
resolution adopted in October 1993, the U.N. Assistance Mission to Rwanda
(UNAMIR).67 However, the presence of these forces did not stop arms
deployment to Rwandan military, rebels, or civilians. When the slaughter
61. David J. Scheffer, UN Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW & ETHNIC CONFLICT
147 (David Wippman ed. 1998).
62. See LAWYERS COMM-rEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 7.
63. Id
64. See Scheffer, supra note 61, at 148.
65. See PRUNIER, supra note 28, at 206.
66. Id at 194.
67. Id.
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began, U.N. troops "had neither a mandate nor equipment enabling them to do
anything."68
Remedial actions were also attempted by State actors. France reacted by
announcing its intention to intervene in Rwanda in mid-June 1994.69 After
France smoothed relations with the RPF, the U.N. Security Council "gave to the
French an intervention mandate under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. 70
Although French forces succeeded in creating a Safe Zone in the southwest of
Rwanda, the killings continued. 7' As the troops prepared to leave at the end of
August 1994, people staying in the Safe Zone decided to flee to safety in other
countries, causing new refugee flows.'
B. The Host Country: TemporaryAsylum or New Death Camps?
To aid people uprooted by World War II, the first response of the
international community was to send asylum-seekers home.Y However, it soon
became clear that a blanket policy of repatriation did not fit the needs of every
refugee. Many of those in Europe sent back East ended up in Stalin's labor
camps.74 As a result, resettlement abroad began to be considered as preferable
to repatriation. 5
In developing countries where internal conflict explodes suddenly,
temporary asylum is often provided by neighboring States until voluntary
repatriation becomes feasible.76 Determining the possibility of returning
refugees to countries of origin is a complex process. Finding appropriate times
to promote repatriation often threatens to sacrifice humanitarian protection of
refugees by the international community.7 7 Repatriating people to countries of
origin where conflict still rages "merely shift[s] the problem" geographically

68. Id.at234.
69. Plaut, supra note 30, at 239.
70. PRUNIER, supra note 28, at 288-90. Although the French wanted an "allied" effort, only Senegal
would agree to send troops to help French forces. Id.
71. Plaut, supranote 30, at 239. For example, the RPF "massacred several hundred people in early July"
after taking possession of the city of Butare. PRUNIER, supra note 28, at 306.
72. PRUNIER, supra note 28, at 310. Hutus fled into Burundi and Tutsis returned from Burundi to
Rwanda. Id.
73. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 22.
74. Id.
75. Id.at23.
76. GIL LOESCHER & ANN DULL LOESCHER,THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS 11 (1994).
77. LAWYERS CoMMrrrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1,at 90.
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and thus fails as a durable solution. 78
During the refugee flows from Rwanda, camps were set up in Zaire to
accommodate those who fled. As reports filtered in about conditions in the
camp, evidence accumulated that pointed out the failure of the international
community to protect the exiles. In addition, it seemed that the humanitarian
aid sent to refugees was being used by those who had perpetrated the genocide.
1. The Life-Threatening Conditions of Refugee Camps
Shortly after Hutu extremists took control ofthe Rwandan government, the
RPF began an offensive to prevent further massacres of the Tutsis. 79 As the
RPF advanced until virtually all of Rwanda (except the Safe Zone in
southwestern Rwanda) was at their disposal, between one and two million
Hutus fled the country. 0 Soon after refugee camps were established in eastern
Zaire, cholera and other diseases swept through the temporary havens claiming
many lives."
The refugees had been led to the camps by the former leaders of their
communities, and a civil order headed by former local officials was
established. 2 Also among the Hutu refugees were the extremists that had led
the slaughter of the Tutsis.83 Much evidence shows that the military forces
hiding among the refugees took control of the distribution of food in the
camps." Remaining in the camps along with genuine refugees, those
responsible for the genocide had the time and the place to rebuild their forces.85
Finally, when thousands of Hutu refugees were found murdered and dumped in
camp latrines, it became obvious that the international community had failed to
keep its promise of protecting the refugees. 6 Other victims are thought to have
been killed as examples to the other refugees to ensure continued control of the
camps by the armed extremist militia.87 When refugees flocked to camps for

78. Id. at 68.
79. Plaut, supra note 30, at 238.
80. Id. at 239.
81. See id
82. PRUNIER, supra note 28, at 313-14.
83. AFRICAN RGTrrs, RWANDA: KILLING THE EVIDENCE 3 (1996); Bill Frelick, Assistance Without
Protection:Feed the Hungry, Clothe the Naked, and Watch Them Die, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1997
24,29 (Virginia Hamilton ed. 1997).
84. Frelick, supra note 83, at 29.
85. Idat 30.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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protection, the political atmosphere of the genocide followed them, creating a
state of war in the camps."
2. The Double-Edged Sword of HumanitarianAid
The refugee situation in Zaire was not the first time that humanitarian aid
had been misused by military forces. During ongoing conflict between Somalia
and Ethiopia in 1988, it was reported that "refugees were being recruited by the
government to fight the rebels." 9 Losing sight of long-term comprehensive
solutions and viewing relief aid as an answer to refugee protection problems
eviscerates the international community's commitment to protecting the legal
rights of refugees in circumstances of temporary asylum.' °
Rather than keeping people alive until a more durable solution becomes
feasible, emergency food aid can actually put refugees in danger of losing their
lives. When peacekeeping personnel are not present to monitor food aid to
refugees or internally displaced persons, the intended beneficiaries sometimes
become the targets of violence.91 Emergency humanitarian aid should not be
viewed as a solution to the complex refugee crises in the developing world. At
most, it should be considered one part of a framework that can protect refugees'
legal rights, keeping people alive and healthy until the conflict they have fled is
resolved, or resettlement becomes a realistic option to end their flight.'
C. Repatriation: The Effects of an Incomplete PoliticalStruggle
When people flee their home country in search of protection from an
explosive civil war, the help they find in the first country of asylum is
temporary. Refugees subsist in camps until they can be resettled or returned
home. In developing countries, potential victims of internal conflict are most
often sent back to their home country after the conflict has subsided.93
Many times, the issues disputed during the violence are not resolved among
the parties. An uneasy peace may have fallen over the country; however, the

88. PRUNIER, supra note 28, at 314.
89. LAWYERS COMMIrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 1, at 63.
90. See Frelick, supra note 83, at 24.
91. In Liberia, more than thirty people were murdered shortly after receiving food bags from humanitarian
aid workers in 1996. "Emergency food aid meant to save lives instead put them in mortal danger." Id
92. Id.at 33.
93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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repatriation of refugees tests the stability of the new political order of the
nation. As the refugees filter back into the country, the effects of an incomplete
resolution to a political struggle are felt anew. First, the survivors and
repatriates themselves face economic warfare and continued violence as they
attempt to rebuild their shattered lives. Second, the fragile government of the
country of origin faces new threats as it tries to reintegrate the refugees into
society. Finally, as repatriation takes place, the role of the international
community comes into question; the host country and those nations that offered
protection are sending the refugees back to the country in which they were
abused-but at what cost?
1. Challenges to Survivors Upon Return
Because many countries where internal conflict has erupted come to only
tentative agreements to stop the violence against their own people, it has become
the role of the UNHCR and the international community to ensure that
repatriation is voluntary and safe for those returning.' Returning to the country
of origin may pose risks similar to those the refugees faced before they fled.
In Rwanda, the genocide continues today; survivors are hunted down while
Hutu witnesses are intimidated into silence or killed.9" Through this silent
continuation of the slaughter, many killers will ensure that their accusers will
be silenced forever." Although the government has pledged to punish the
perpetrators of the violence of 1994, those who publicly accuse the murderers
are often killed before action is taken.97 Much of the violence takes place in the
countryside. There, many villagers fear that the return of the refugees will
spark a new wave of mass killings.9 Thus, upon their return, many refugees are
subjected to aggression by their former neighbors. These scare tactics prevent
the successful reintegration of those repatriated."
In addition to violence, returnees also face economic challenges. During the
initial violence, many fled as their homes were destroyed and looted."° With no
property and no home, returnees and survivors become "internal migrants;"

94. See GORMAN, supra note 59, at 7.
95. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 3.
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id. at 19.
98. Plaut, supranote 30, at 239.
99. See AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 46.
100. Id. at 3.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:315

although they have returned to their home country, they continue to live like
unwanted refugees.' A lack of adequate housing and the means to rebuild
exacerbates the situation. In addition, even if the homes and businesses of the
refugees still stand, they are oftentimes occupied by other survivors of the
genocide.0 2 Further, if the returnees demand the return of property seized
during the 1994 violence, they may be placing their lives at risk again.0 3
In short, the return of the refugees to their home country evinces the
imperfect nature of the temporary resolution to the internal violence that
prompted their original flight. As illustrated by the situation in Rwanda, the
returnees face both renewed violence and economic challenges as they attempt
to rebuild their lives. Although the government struggles to protect the rights
of the returnees, the balance of internal stability is threatened by the influx of
the refugees. By turning a deaf ear to the concerns of the refugees, the new
Rwandan government has helped to perpetuate the genocide. °4
2. The GovernmentalStruggle to Maintain Peace
After the explosions of violence quiet, the government is left to put the
pieces of their war-torn nation back together. As a fragile peace is established,
the international community looks for the first opportunity to allow the refugees
to return to their country "voluntarily."'0' In Rwanda, public officials have
faced attacks from all sides as refugees return. As explored above, the concerns
of the refugees push the government to integrate the returnees into society. In
addition, the influx of the refugees triggers a reaction from the extremists who
threaten the legitimacy of the government through continued violence. Finally,
the political agenda of the international community pressures the new
government to make bold moves that may lead to renewed conflict. As a result,
the government of Rwanda has been pushed and pulled in many
diredtions--cornered into making promises it may not be able to keep.
The present government of Rwanda is led by a coalition of Tutsi and Hutu
moderates; however, Hutu extremists are threatened by the return of the
101. Id.
102. Id.atl.
103. Id.at 10.
104. Id.at3.
105. See LAWYERS COMMrTTEE FOR HuMAN.RJG-rS, supra note 1, at 138-39. In August 1994, the
UNHCR canceled the "first organized repatriation convoy from Goma after death threats to the returnee
candidates from [former government military forces no longer officially in power]." PRUNIERsupra note 28,
at 310.
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refugees and further governmental efforts to remedy the past. The President has
' 6
promised that "those responsible for the killings will be brought tojustice."' 0
Yet, survivors and returnees continue to be killed." 7
Government officials are also threatened. When local officials are attacked
because of their capacity as public figures, the current leadership loses its
mantle of legitimacy. Fearing for their lives, "fewer decent people are prepared
to accept positions of responsibility" as representatives of the new
government.0 8 Without representatives to maintain local political relations,
political instability is perpetuated.'"
Ill. GLOBAL INVOLVEMENT: CREATING INTEGRATED
SOLUTIONS TO COMPLEX PROBLEMS

As the Rwanda example shows, modem refugee crises are complicated and
problematic. When the international community becomes involved in a refugee
situation, the primary goal of the international commitment should be the
protection of the refugees. "' However, due to the complexity of many
situations, proper solutions to problems faced by the country of origin are not
always easily defined. In the short term, the international community must find
effective ways to protect refugees in camps. Looking at long-term goals, the
United Nations and individual nations must create strategies to implement
durable solutions and attempt to understand the dynamics underlying refugee
crises.
The tragic state of affairs that continues in Rwanda and the violence that
has overtaken the Democratic Republic of Congo indicate the imperfections of
the current system of refugee protection. The lessons of Rwanda should
instruct the international community on which approaches to refugees are
successful and which approaches potentially place refugees at risk. First, the
role of the international community in responding to refugees must be rethought.

106. Plaut, supra note 30, at 239. In late April 1998, the Rwandan government carried out the first
executions of those accused of being responsible for the genocide; yet, the terror continues. Amnesty
International, Rwanda, the Hidden Violence: "Disappearances" and Killings Continue, (last altered June
23, 1998) <http://www.amnesty.orglailib/intcamrep.intro.htn>.
107. "Outspoken" survivors that advocate accountability are likely targets. AFRICAN RIGmis, supra note
83, at 19.
108. Id.at 3.
109. See M'Bokolo, supra note 27, at 180.
110. John Fredriksson, Revitalizing Resettlement as a Durable Solution, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY
1997, supra note 83, at 48.
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Retooling the UNHCR substantively and procedurally will allow the agency to
work more effectively. Next, traditional solutions such as repatriation and
resettlement should be considered, along with updating procedures to allow
these options to help resolve modern refugee predicaments. Finally, a study
should be conducted to assess the role of ethnicity in the politics of the
developing world. Ongoing political conflict in Central Africa illustrates the
importance of understanding the implications of ethnic hatred in internal
conflict.
A. Updating the Mandate of the UNHCR
One way to improve the effective protection of refugees is to pinpoint the
roles of the international community in general, and the LNHCR specifically,
in situations that result in the mass exodus of refugees. The functions of
international involvement can be viewed and critiqued on two different and
interrelated levels. The breadth of the mandate of the UNHCR should be
reviewed and refined. By defining its sphere of action, the UNHCR can return
its primary focus to refugee protection within a clearly stated international
mandate.
As discussed above, the UNHCR has developed in an ad hoc fashion,
responding and adapting to new refugee needs."' Thus, because of its very
nature, the agency has remained active in international crises precisely by
disregarding its express mandates of 1951 and 1967. The international
community's need for the UNHCR has changed drastically since the Protocol
was signed."' Indeed, some feel a desperate need to convene a conference to
revise the 1951 Convention." 3
Protection has been compromised through the increased breadth of the
agency's mandate. Through its progressive workings during different phases
of refugee aid, the UNHCR and the international community have allowed the
mandate of the agency to be broadened to include efforts not anticipated in its
original express jurisdiction." 4 Such remedial efforts are said to encourage
political and economic stability and indirectly ensure less migration for

111. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 5.
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economic reasons among younger nations."'
One way the mandate of the UNHCR was broadened was by viewing
refugee problems as a process to be addressed at different phases of flight and
return. This view resulted in protection measures being instituted at various
times commencing in the country of origin, during flight, or within the country
of first asylum."I6 In addition, the UNHCR has also continued its involvement
in post-repatriation, reintegrating returnees into their homelands. Additionally,
it has addressed concerns of the internally displaced, who never formally
qualified for legal protection ofthe agency because they remained in their home
country during the crisis that threatened them." 7
Related to widening the scope of protection during a violent crisis, the
mandate of the UNHCR has also grown to encompass the administration of
much infrastructure aid. This is a remedial measure to implement repatriation
that discourages subsequent migration for economic reasons. However, these
preventive efforts are of equivocal value at best. Funds provided for
development by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have
failed to solve Africa's economic crisis." 8 Also, the UNHCR has traditionally
found development funds problematic, particularly in Africa." 9 Because the
developing world remains unstable politically, it is difficult to predict accurately
what combination of aid will prevent a political uprising. By understanding the
ethnic conflicts that form the impetus behind much of the violence,
infrastructure aid will be more effectively distributed.
Another problematic facet of humanitarian aid is reflected in the UNHCR
funding structure. Donors want the UNHCR to help "develop" impoverished
countries; yet, nations are mistrustful ofthe direct appropriation of funds by the
agency. 20 Donor governments increasingly earmark funds, restricting the
agency's involvement in infrastructure aid situations.' Such discretionary
funding by governments allows States, not the international community as a
whole, to choose worthy aid recipients. The adoption of a broader international
definition ofthe term "refugee" would strengthen arguments that aid is helping
those legally recognized as "refugees."

115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 97.
Id. at 25.
See Fredriksson, supra note 110, at 48.
M'Bokoio, supra note 27, at 180.

119. LAWYERS CoMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHs, supra note 1, at 105.

120. Id. at 88.
121. Id.at 135.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:315

Discussion ofthe role ofthe UNHCR as an intergovernmental organization
shows that over-breadth of the mandate is only partly responsible for the
ineffectiveness of the UNHCR; the structure of the international system also
contributes to the problems of refugee protection. Ideally, the UNHCR would
be an apolitical agency, defending the rights of refugees around the globe
without preferring one nation's victims over any other's. 12 In fact, through
restrictive funding measures, the preferences of the donor countries often color
the actions of the UNHCR with decidedly political hues. 23 Also, agency efforts
are often undermined when individual governments or other branches of the
United Nations fail to support the assessments of the High Commissioner. 24 As
an intergovernmental organization, the UNHCR can only be as successful as
its donors will allow. A new Convention should be called to solve the
procedural and substantive problems that face the agency. The mandate of the
UNHCR should be redefined with the challenges of the developing world in
mind.
An express modem mandate for the UNHCR should be narrowly tailored
substantively. Developmental aid and infi-astructure aid should be differentiated,
limiting the scope of the UNHCR to immediate post-crisis help. For example,
because the UNHCR has had difficulty administering developmental aid in the
past, this sort of aid should be left to the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP).'25 A new convention should also consider updating the
definition of a "refugee." As shown above, a broader definition would more
clearly reflect the work of the UNHCR today and make stronger arguments for
donor involvement in crises.
Factoring developmental functions out of the UNHCR equation would
allow the agency to focus on protecting those who have fled their countries.
Recalibrating the agency to deal effectively with victims ofviolence should help
the UNHCR respond to extreme situations. Instead of juggling the
responsibilities of international emergencies with those of economic migration,
the UNHCR would work with the UNDP in efforts to coordinate aid in search
of comprehensive solutions that include resettlement and repatriation.

122. Statute, supra note 7, 2.
123. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 135-36.
124. See Frelick, supra note 83, at 25.
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GORMAN, supra note 59, at 10.
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B. Reassessing DurableSolutions
In attempting to answer the complexities posed by refugee flow in the
developing world, a lesson should be taken from the past. Specifically, the
UNHCR should review lasting solutions for the massive flows of people that
accompany violent political upheaval within a nation. Repatriation and
resettlement have been tools used successfully to abate the waves of those
fleeing violence. Working these traditional approaches into comprehensive
solutions will better serve the safety of the refugees who rely on the UNHCR
for protection.
Repatriation, as overseen by the UNHCR, requires that the agency work
with both sides of the return effort, recognizing the special assistance and
protection the returnees need in their homeland.'26 This role serves a dual
function: first, to ensure that the return is a voluntary undertaking by the
refugees; and second, to safeguard the rights of the refugees upon their return.
Adequately fulfilling these roles maintains the focus upon protection by the
international community.
The principle of nonrefoulement has long been regarded as a cornerstone
that guides the repatriation of refugees.'27 This concept forbids a country in
which refugees have sought temporary asylum from returning them against their
will to the country from which they fled.' However, many situations have
given rise to countries of asylum sending away refugees when the voluntary
nature of their repatriation was, at best, questionable. 29 For example, the
Zairean government returned about 17,000 refugees to Rwanda in the fall of
1995. ""It is unclear whether the Rwandans returned out of fear of rebel forces
within Zaire or whether they simply wished to return home.'
Ensuring the safety of the refugees upon return has also proven a stumbling
block for the UNHCR. Additional Rwandans cited a mistrust of the
government as the primary concern in their recent refusal to return home." 2
Ongoing strife in other developing countries shows that the safety of refugees
depends upon a successful conclusion to the political upheaval that sparked the
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refugee flow; this is a difficult guarantee to enforce for an extended period of
time.'33
Due to the effects of recurrent violence in the developing world, some
believe that third-country resettlement is the best viable approach to modem
refugee problems. Theoretically, this concept sidesteps the problems
encountered by attempts to repatriate refugees by eliminating the country of
origin from the ultimate solution. Thus, it specifically deletes the possibility of
refoulement and avoids physical threats that refugees potentially face upon their
34
return. 1
Additionally, using resettlement as a tool in volatile refugee situations,
taking into account their special "social composition... or ethnic background,"
may give specific relief to minority groups. 131 Using this solution will provide
permanent homes to those who have been, in effect, exiled by a new political
regime in their homeland.'36
Unfortunately, Rwandans have also defied the concept of resettlement as a
lasting solution to the internal conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The
1994 massacres were attributed in part to the return of second generation
Rwandans living in Zaire as a result of violent conflict that arose during and
immediately after independence.' 37 More recently, the continued efforts ofthe
Democratic Republic of Congo to repatriate refugees from this decade's conflict
38
has precluded a second attempt at resettlement for many Rwandans.1
C. Addressing the Issue of Ethnicity
The genocide in Rwanda during 1994 should be viewed as a point in a
continuum dating at least as far back as 1959 and extending into the future.
Placing modem refugee crises within the context oftheir ethnic roots will allow
the international community to fill in the particulars of assessing durable
solutions and determining a modem refugee situation. Without understanding
the causes of the violence precipitating the refugee flows, a modem refugee
39
definition and solution assessment cannot be successful.
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A recurring theme in the problems of protecting refugees from developing
countries is the political uncertainty that persists in many developing nations.
This instability can be seen as a product of "economic adversity, political
uncertainty and social inequities" that permeate developing nations. 4 These
factors often identify different ethnic groups as the key players in the struggle
for power. 4 ' The deep-seated conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis
exemplifies the nature of ethnic ties in violent political internal conflicts. In
addition, continuing violence within the Democratic Republic of Congo evinces
the ongoing nature of the regional ethnic rivalries involved. 42 Accounting for
these ethnic relations when viewing the problems of modem refugees may allow
lasting political solutions to an otherwise dismal scenario.
The actions of the United Nations in response to the 1994 violence in
Rwanda have been criticized as "display[ing] a degree of indecision seldom seen
even in that body's chequered history ofdecision-making."' 4 3 This hesitancy is
partly due to the competing pulls of territorial political sovereignty and selfdetermination within the context of ethnic conflict.'" Although the United
Nations has supported the use of force "to overcome colonial control," many
member States will not encourage separatism. 4WThus, "the General Assembly
has yet to recognize self-determination as a freestanding principle[,] the
implementation of which ... is integral to the resolution of major ethnic
conflicts."'4 6
The situation in Rwanda can partially be explained as a "crisis of the
institution of the State."'47 When resources are monopolized by one ethnic
community, those ethnic groups excluded form groups with the goal of
destroying the State.' 8 Modem African States have been unable "to construct

occurring before I January 1951." Geneva Convention, supranote 3, at 152. This was not a treaty meant to
stand for all time, but to implement solutions for immediate problems related to refugees.
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an institution of the State. . .that functions and accommodates the diverging
and often conflicting interests of the diverse ethnic nationalities within its
borders."' 49
Due to this failure of the institution of the State in developing countries,
perhaps some form of self-determination should be supported to remedy ethnic
conflicts and their attendant refugee problems. One approach will involve
promoting "ethnic self-determination" and/or "regional integration" to seek
better ethnic relations.'5 ° These political solutions would have drastic facial
implications-the map of Africa would be redrawn.'
The concept of ethnic self-determination has gained legitimacy throughout
the world.' However, independent African nations have generally opposed
changing their boundaries.'53 In addition, as discussed above in Part II, the
international community, through the United Nations, has recognized only a
qualified right to self-determination." Yet, the recent independence of Eritrea
from Ethiopia may signal the beginning of a new attitude toward ethnic selfdetermination. 5
Another route to improved relations may lie in regional integration, whereby
smaller countries, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are subsumed into a larger
State, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although present political
tensions belie this possible solution, "desperate economic realities" may
encourage African States to reconsider this option.'56
Redrawing maps may seem too distant on the horizon to clear the pressing
political tensions in the developing nations of the world. However, it is possible
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that the regional integration evinced through the European Union and other
pacts such as the North American Free Trade Agreement may encourage
developing States to consider integration and help the world move into the
twenty-first century more peacefully. 5 '
CONCLUSION

The continuing repercussions of the strife in Rwanda may lead a casual
observer to become frustrated with the poor results that have been achieved.
Perhaps the situation in the tiny African State is the product of a series of
anomalies that no efforts could adequately address. However, modem trends
in refugee flows point to the contrary. Today, the overwhelming majority ofthe
world's refugees come from developing countries.'58 Also, other conflicts
"suggest that ethnic hatred [has become] the main cause of refugee
movements."' 59 As a result, Rwanda begins to look less like an anomaly and
more like a harbinger of the challenges to come. Thus, the international
community should move quickly to learn from the circumstances of Rwanda.
The continuing struggles in Rwanda, and Central Africa in general, are in
part the result of a series of global institutional stalemates. Creating
comprehensive solutions to the political problems of the developing world
suggests changes at many levels of international involvement. The role of the
UNHCR should be redefined to deal more specifically with modem refugee
challenges. A new refugee definition is needed to address the complexities of
modern crises. Also, focus should return to protecting refugees through
practical reliance on traditional remedial solutions, such as resettlement and
repatriation. Finally, acknowledging ethnic hatred as a root cause of many of
today's refugee challenges is an important step in crafting solutions. By
preferencing self-determination in post-colonial countries where the institution
of the State has failed, new approaches, such as regional integration and ethnic
self-determination, can be explored.
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